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ARTICLE
John G. Browning
Should Judges Have a Duty of Tech Competence?
Abstract. In an era in which lawyers are increasingly held to a higher
standard of “tech competence” in their representation of clients, shouldn’t we
similarly require judges to be conversant in relevant technology? Using realworld examples of judicial missteps with or refusal to use technology, and
drawn from actual cases and judicial disciplinary proceedings, this Article argues
that in today’s Digital Age, judicial technological competence is necessary. At
a time when courts themselves have proven vulnerable to cyberattacks, and
when courts routinely tackle technology-related issues like data privacy and the
admissibility of digital evidence, Luddite judges are relics that the future—not
to mention the present—can ill afford.
Author. John G. Browning is a partner in the Plano, Texas office of Spencer
Fane, LLP, where he handles a wide variety of civil litigation and appeals in
state and federal courts. He serves as Chair of the Computer & Technology
Section of the State Bar of Texas, as an adjunct professor at SMU Dedman
School of Law, and as a faculty member for the Texas Center for the Judiciary,
the Federal Judicial Center, and the Appellate Judges Educational Institute. A
nationally recognized thought leader on technology and the law, John is the
author of four books, forty law review articles, and hundreds of other articles.
His works have been cited in over 350 law review articles, practice guides in
eleven states, and by courts in California, Florida, Maryland, New York,
Tennessee, Texas, and Puerto Rico. John gratefully acknowledges the insights
of United States District Judge Xavier Rodriguez in the preparation of this
Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During a conference of state supreme court chief justices, after hearing a
discussion of how judges cannot be told what to do, a guest (counsel for a
large corporation) is reported to have said, “I’ve listened to you people talk.
I’ve got to tell you, you just don’t get it. You don’t have a clue what’s going
on out in this world today.”1 He then explained how slow, incremental
changes would not stave off the exodus to alternative dispute resolution and
arbitration “because the economy’s moving too fast, and you are moving
too slow.”2
Yet, despite this warning, judges across the country regularly exhibit
ignorance of or unwillingness to educate themselves about the technologies
around which modern life revolves. And it’s not simply a matter of the
1. An Interview with Thomas Zlaket, CT. REV., Fall 2000, at 4, 11.
2. Id.
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occasional snickering over a judge not understanding how texting or cloud
storage works; court operations from docket management to courtrooms,
themselves, are increasingly driven by technology, and, indeed, judges must
frequently rule on issues implicating matters of technology.3 A judge’s role
demands tech competence in a wide range of matters from overseeing
technology used in courtroom presentations, ruling on discovery and
evidentiary issues involving digital sources, to their ethical use of technology
like social media.4 As the executive director of the Alaska Commission on
Judicial Conduct observed in 2014, “[b]oth the effectiveness of an
individual judge and the imperative to promote confidence in the judiciary
require technological literacy.”5
Judges themselves are aware of the problem of insufficient tech
competence. In 2019, technology vendor, Exterro, and Duke Law’s
EDRM6 conducted a survey of federal judges, which showed that, while
fifty-six percent agreed that lawyers’ tech competence in e-discovery matters
was adequate, only thirty percent of those surveyed were satisfied with their
own level of tech training or education.7 Seventy percent said federal judges
should receive more training and education on e-discovery technology and
practices, while an additional five percent called for “extensive increases” in
such training.8
3. See, e.g., Marla N. Greenstein, Judges Must Keep Up with Technology: It’s Not Just for Lawyers,
JUDGES’ J., Fall 2014, at 40, 40 (“[J]udges increasingly are asked to issue search warrants for electronic
data with changing privacy implications.”).
4. John G. Browning & Don Willett, Rules of Engagement: Exploring Judicial Use of Social Media,
79 TEX. B.J. 100, 101 (2016) (exploring how a judge’s misuse of technology can give “at least the
appearance of a lack of impartiality” potentially resulting in overturned cases); Eric Goldman, Emojis
and the Law, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1227, 1230 (2018) (determining the meaning of emojis is an area of
technology which judges are actively navigating). Additionally, although the COVID-19 global
pandemic struck after the deadline for this Article and the Symposium at which it was presented, the
rush by courts all over the country to conduct hearings and other proceedings via videoconferencing
platforms, like Zoom, underscores the importance of tech competence in times of crisis. On
April 8, 2020, the Supreme Court of Texas made history when, for the first time, it held oral arguments
via Zoom. Amy Howe, Courtroom Access: Faced with a Pandemic, the Supreme Court Pivots, SCOTUSBLOG
(Apr. 16, 2020, 2:58 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/04/courtroom-access-faced-with-apandemic-the-supreme-court-pivots/ [https://perma.cc/4CEJ-L6PR].
5. Greenstein, supra note 3, at 40.
6. EDRM is the Electronic Discovery Reference Model, an organization that sets the standards
for e-discovery practice. ERDM, DUKE LAW CTR. JUD. STUD., https://web.law.duke.edu/judicial
studies/edrm/ [https://perma.cc/849X-5P22].
7. 5th Annual Federal Judges Survey: E-Discovery Advice for Becoming a Better Attorney, EXTERRO 2, 14
(Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.exterro.com/2019-judges-survey-ediscovery/ [https://perma.cc/Q7S2RHX6].
8. Id. at 14.
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Recently, much has been written regarding the revision to Comment 8 of
ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1, which states that lawyers
have a responsibility to not only “keep abreast of changes in the law and its
practice,” but also remain conversant in “the benefits and risks associated
with relevant technology.”9 To date, thirty-eight states have adopted this
language or a variation of it.10 Yet, while judges have their own model code
of conduct, this code does not contain a counterpart duty of tech
competence, and neither does any individual state’s judicial code of conduct.
Perhaps the closest that the Model Code of Judicial Conduct comes to
supporting such a duty can be found in two provisions. A comment to
Rule 2.5 broadly defines judicial competence as requiring not only legal
knowledge, but also the “skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably
necessary to perform a judge’s responsibilities of judicial office.”11 In the
Digital Age, this could encompass everything from an awareness of
cybersecurity risks, such as ransomware and how court systems might be
affected, to the competence needed to assess the quality of counsel’s
Internet legal research12 and knowing how to ethically use social media in
one’s professional and personal capacities.13 And in an age of escalating
use of technology by bad actors for everything from revenge porn to
cyberstalking, cyberbullying, and adopting false Internet personas, it has
become critical for judges to have a working knowledge of the technology
underlying such causes of action.14 As studies of the admissibility and
evidentiary significance of emojis have demonstrated, means of
9. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see, e.g.,
John G. Browning, The New Duty of Digital Competence: Being Ethical and Competent in the Age of Facebook
and Twitter, 44 U. DAYTON L. REV. 179, 183 (2019) (“[T]he California Bar made it clear that it requires
attorneys who represent clients in litigation to either be competent in e-discovery or to get help from
those who are competent.”).
10. Robert Ambrogi, 38 States Have Adopted the Duty of Technology Competence, LAWSITES,
https://www.lawsitesblog.com/tech-competence [https://perma.cc/4XMJ-D8FD] (listing the states
that have adopted a duty to remain competent in technology).
11. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.5 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
12. See Cass v. 1410088 Ontario, Inc., [2018] O.J. No. 6148 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct.) (QL)
(questioning why CanLII was not used for legal research to keep costs down).
13. See John G. Browning, Why Can’t We Be Friends? Judges’ Use of Social Media, 68 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 487, 533 (2014) (“[A] judge’s misuse of social media can certainly violate canons of ethics and
negatively impact public perception of the judiciary . . . .”); Browning & Willett, supra note 4, at 100
(suggesting when more judges start to use social media, it “often translates to more judges using social
media badly”).
14. See Fredric I. Lederer, Judging in the Age of Technology, JUDGES’ J., Fall 2014, at 6, 8
(“As technology permeates our lives, it also affects the types of cases that courts must resolve, the
procedural and evidentiary law to be applied, and the court’s culture.”).
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communicating online have led to a new language of sorts, one which judges
are increasingly called upon to interpret.15
II. CAUTIONARY TALES
A. Judge Michael Bitney
The second provision in the Model Code of Judicial Conduct is Rule 1.2,
which mandates that a judge “shall act at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
judiciary.”16 Unfortunately, there is an abundance of examples of judges
whose misuse of technology—or refusal to use it—tends to undermine
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Consider the recent case of Wisconsin Judge Michael Bitney, for
example. Judge Bitney was presiding over a family court matter in 2017, in
which Angela Carroll filed a motion to modify a joint custody order and
shared physical placement of her son on the grounds that the boy’s father,
Timothy Miller, “had engaged in a pattern of domestic abuse against her.”17
After the parties had submitted their written arguments, Judge Bitney
accepted Carroll’s Facebook friend request.18 Not long after, Carroll
“liked” eighteen of Judge Bitney’s Facebook posts and commented on two
of them.19 None of these likes or comments related to the pending
litigation, and Judge Bitney replied to neither Carroll’s comments nor
“likes.”20 However, Carroll “liked” and shared various third-party posts,
including one on domestic violence; this “activity could have appeared on
[Judge Bitney’s] Facebook ‘newsfeed.’”21
After Bitney issued a ruling granting Carroll’s motion to modify, Miller
learned of the Facebook friendship between his ex and the judge.22 When
Miller’s motion to reconsider the ruling was denied, he appealed the issue to
15. See John G. Browning & Gwendolyn Seale, More Than Words: The Evidentiary Value of Emoji,
FOR THE DEF., Oct. 2015, at 34, 35–36 (highlighting a United States District Court judge’s decision to
allow emojis to be shown to the jury as “they are meant to be read”); Goldman, supra note 4, at 1230
(“[E]mojis contribute to misunderstandings that will require judicial interpretation.”).
16. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
17. Miller v. Carroll (In re Paternity of B.J.M.), 925 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Wis. Ct. App. 2019).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 582–83.
21. Id. at 583.
22. See id. (“Miller confirmed the Facebook connection between Carroll and Judge Bitney. He
then moved the circuit court for reconsideration . . . .”).

2020]

Should Judges Have a Duty of Tech Competence?

181

the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.23 The appellate court vacated the ruling
and, in what it acknowledged as a case of first impression, held that the
establishment of an undisclosed Facebook connection between a judge and
a litigant appearing in ongoing litigation before that judge “created a great
risk of actual bias, resulting in the appearance of partiality.”24 Although
declining to adopt a bright-line rule governing judicial use of social media,
the court recognized that, while a Facebook friendship does not necessarily
denote a more traditional friendship, the fact that the connection was not
disclosed and that Carroll was a current litigant before Judge Bitney
heightened the appearance of partiality.25 The court also concluded that
Carroll’s “liking” and “sharing” of posts concerning domestic violence was
a form of ex parte communication that held at least the possibility of
affecting Judge Bitney’s decision-making.26
B. Judge Edward Bearse
Judge Bitney, sadly, is far from an isolated cautionary tale. Judges around
the country have found themselves facing recusal motions, disciplinary
proceedings, or have been forced to resign from office due to their ethical
lapses in judicial use of social media.27 For a number of these judges, a lack
of understanding of the relevant technology and its functionality was at least
partially to blame for the judge’s lapse in judgment.
Consider, for example, Senior Judge Edward W. Bearse of Minnesota. In
November 2015, Judge Bearse was publicly reprimanded by the
Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards for his Facebook posts about cases
he was presiding over—including one that resulted in a vacated verdict.28
Bearse (who had served on the bench for thirty-two years, retired in
2006, and was sitting statewide by appointment) referred to
Hennepin County District Court in one post as “a zoo.”29 In another, he
23. See id. (“[Judge Bitney] concluded that ‘even given the timing of’ his and Carroll’s Facebook
connection, the circumstances did not ‘rise to the level of objective bias . . . .’”).
24. Id. at 582.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 587 (“[An] erosion of public confidence and appearance of impropriety occurred
here.”).
27. For a broader discussion, see generally Browning, supra note 13, at 489, which “examines
both the positive aspects of judges participating in social media as well as the ethical pitfalls.”
28. See generally In re Bearse, File No. 15-17 (Minn. Bd. Jud. Standards Nov. 20, 2015) (amended
public reprimand) (providing multiple instances of Judge Bearse’s inappropriate actions resulting in the
Board’s investigation and eventual public reprimand).
29. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 9.
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reflected on a case in which the defense counsel had to be taken away by an
ambulance mid-trial, likely to result “in chaos because defendant has to hire
a new lawyer who will most likely want to start over and a very vulnerable
woman will have to spend another day on the witness stand . . . .”30
During State v. Weaver, a sex trafficking trial, Bearse posted the following:
Some things I guess will never change. I just love doing the stress of jury
trials. In a Felony trial now State prosecuting a pimp. Cases are always
difficult because the women (as in this case also) will not cooperate. We will
see what the 12 citizens in the jury box do.31

After a guilty verdict, the prosecutor discovered Bearse’s Facebook post
and disclosed it to the defense counsel, who successfully moved for a new
trial because of the prejudice implied by the post.32 In the disciplinary
proceeding, Bearse explained that he was new to Facebook,33 was unaware
of privacy settings, and did not realize his posts were publicly viewable.34
The Board concluded that he had put his “personal communications
preferences above his judicial responsibilities,” given at least the appearance
of a lack of impartiality, and had engaged in “conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.”35
C. Judge William Shubb
Another cautionary tale about judicial use of social media almost made it
to the United States Supreme Court. The case of United States v. Sierra Pacific
Industries, Inc.36 arose out of a two week wildfire in September 2007—
dubbed the “Moonlight Fire” due to its proximity to Moonlight Peak—that
devastated nearly 46,000 acres of forest in northern California.37 The
California Attorney General filed suit in August 2009 against
Sierra Pacific Industries, blaming the lumber giant for the blaze.38 A federal
30. Id. at ¶ 5.
31. Id. at ¶ 3.
32. Id. at ¶ 4.
33. See id. (stating Bearse had been using Facebook to communicate with his grandchildren for
only two years).
34. In re Bearse, File No. 15-17 at 5 (Minn. Bd. Jud. Standards Nov. 20, 2015) (mem.).
35. In re Bearse, File No. 15-17 at ¶ 12 (Minn. Bd. Jud. Standards Nov. 20, 2015) (amended
public reprimand).
36. United States v. Sierra Pac. Indus., 862 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2675
(2018).
37. Id. at 1163.
38. Id. at 1163–64.
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lawsuit paralleling the state court action was soon filed as well, and in
July 2012, a settlement was reached by the parties to the federal court case,
in which the defendants denied liability.39
In February 2014, the state court lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice
because the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case against any of the
defendants.40 The state court judge also awarded sanctions against the
plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ counsel for extensive discovery abuses.41 Armed
with these favorable rulings and the results of an independent investigation,
Sierra Pacific moved to vacate the settlement, alleging “fraud on the
court.”42 United States District Court Judge William B. Shubb denied that
motion.43
Sierra Pacific appealed, pointing out that on the same day of the ruling,
the United States Attorney’s office for the Eastern District of California
had posted several tweets about the outcome of the case.44 Judge Shubb
followed the Eastern District of California on Twitter (@EDCAnews) “and
had purportedly received tweets about the merits of the case.”45 According
to Sierra Pacific’s lawyers, Judge Shubb “tweeted about the case from his
then-public Twitter account (@Nostalgist1),” using the headline
“Sierra Pacific still liable for Moonlight Fire damages,” and providing a link
to an article concerning the case.46 Sierra Pacific’s lawyer underscored how
not only was the tweet inaccurate, “it also increased the appearance of bias
and ‘prejudice[d] Sierra Pacific’” in the then-pending state court appeal.47
During the appeal of Judge Shubb’s ruling, federal prosecutors advised him
that his Twitter usage had become an appellate issue, prompting
Judge Shubb to change his account’s privacy settings to “protected,”
allowing only authorized followers to see his tweets.48
In July 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed Judge Shubb’s ruling denying the defendants’ motion to set aside
39. Id. at 1164.
40. Id. at 1165.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1165–66.
43. Id. at 1166.
44. Id.
45. Browning & Willett, supra note 4, at 101.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Appellants’ Motion for Judicial Notice or, In the Alternative, Motion to Supplement the
Record on Appeal; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declaration of William R. Warne at 5,
Sierra Pac. Indus., 862 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-15799).
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the federal settlement.49 However, the court also took the opportunity to
recognize the important issues raised by the trial judge’s use of social media,
stating “this case is a cautionary tale about the possible pitfalls of judges
engaging in social media activity relating to pending cases, and we reiterate
the importance of maintaining the appearance of propriety both on and off
the bench.”50
With respect to Judge Shubb’s Twitter activities, the Ninth Circuit panel
felt that they did not warrant his retroactive recusal for two reasons. First,
with Twitter’s status as a service used by news organizations, government
officials, and others “as an official means of communication,” the mere fact
of the federal judge “following” the federal prosecution’s Twitter account
did not constitute evidence of the kind of personal relationship needed for
recusal.51 Second, under the Ninth Circuit’s plain error standard of review,
the mere tweeting of a title and link to a publicly available article about the
case, without any commentary or other indicia of partiality, would not rise
to the level of error by Judge Shubb in failing to recuse himself
retroactively.52
While the Ninth Circuit may have missed the opportunity for a teachable
moment for judges venturing onto social media, and despite the
United States Supreme Court ultimately denying the defendants’ petition
for writ of certiorari, this case still serves as the cautionary tale to which the
Ninth Circuit alluded.53 A more sophisticated, technologically proficient
user would have realized the publicly accessible, non-private nature of his
Twitter account—not to mention the numerous identifying features tying
Judge Shubb to the account.54 Putting aside the troubling ethical issue of
whether Judge Shubb’s Twitter activity violated Canon 255 and

49. Sierra Pac. Indus., 862 F.3d at 1175–76.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1174.
52. Id. at 1175.
53. See id. at 1176 n.17 (“In making this decision, we do not express any opinion as to the
veracity of either party’s factual assertions, attempt to decide any of the underlying issues, or express
any opinion as to the troubling issues discussed in the state court opinion. Nor do we make any
findings as to the alleged use of the judge’s Twitter account, which was an issue undeveloped in the
district court. Those questions must be resolved, if at all, in another forum.”).
54. Appellants’ Reply in Support of Motion for Judicial Notice or, In the Alternative, Motion
to Supplement the Record on Appeal at 5–8, Sierra Pac. Indus., 862 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2017)
(No. 15-15799).
55. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2 (Jud. Conf. 2019) (requiring
judges to “avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities”).
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Canon 3A(6)56 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, this entire
situation could have been avoided if the judge had a greater degree of
technological competence.
Not everyone agrees with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling or the United States
Supreme Court’s decision to deny certiorari. The results of a 2015 online
poll showed eighty-five percent of respondents agreed that “(1) the judge’s
tweet was improper and (2) judges should not tweet about cases before
them.”57 Further, in his article Judicial Ethics and the Internet (Revisited), retired
Judge Herbert B. Dixon Jr. argued that judicial competence necessarily
encompasses an understanding of how new and emerging technologies
impact a jurist’s ethical obligations.58 As Judge Dixon sagely observed:
The technologies of the Internet are new and still developing, but our
principles of fairness are well established. . . . Any appearance of partiality
resulting from a judge’s conduct on the Internet or any social media platform
toward or against any party is a result our justice system cannot tolerate.59

There are, sadly, many other examples of judicial misuse of social media,
ranging from judges disciplined for impermissibly endorsing a political
candidate through “likes” and posts; posting controversial content on social
networking platforms; to questionable Facebook “friendships” and ex parte
communications online.60 However, to the extent that they stem not from
a lack of tech competence but from ethical lapses are beyond the scope of
this paper.
D. Judge Bruce Scolton
While misusing technology can undermine public confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary, refusal to use technology can undermine
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.
In December 2018,
Judge Bruce Scolton resigned his position as court justice for the town of
Harmony, New York—a position he had held for twenty-eight years—and

56. Id. Canon 3A(6) (“A judge should not make public comment on the merits of a matter
pending or impending in any court.”).
57. Herbert B. Dixon Jr., Judicial Ethics and the Internet (Revisited), JUDGES’ J., Fall 2018, at 37, 38.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 462 (2013)
(discussing judicial participation in electronic social networking).
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“agreed to never seek judicial office again.”61 The reason? According to a
complaint filed with the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct,
Judge Scolton “did not use his court email account for more than three
years[,] . . . had not activated or used a computer provided to him by a grant
from the Office of Court Administration[,] . . . [and] had failed to install
certain court-related software on the computer,” rendering the
Harmony Town Court unable to receive electronically-filed traffic
citations.62 In a news release from the Commission, it noted that
Judge Scolton had “failed to make timely reports and deposits of court
funds to the State Comptroller,” and to give notice to the Department of
Motor Vehicles regarding deficient drivers.63 The release went on to note
that “public confidence” required local justices like Scolton “to account
scrupulously for, and timely remit, all fines” owed to make “prompt and
accurate reports of dispositions, so that a judge in a later case, for example,
may properly adjudicate and fine a repeat traffic offender.”64 Judge Scolton
had been using paper forms of his own design to notify the Department of
Motor Vehicles about dispositions—even though the department did not
accept the paper forms he had been filing since 1991.65
III. OTHER REASONS WHY JUDICIAL TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETENCE
IS NECESSARY
A. Holding Lawyers, Court Staff, and Jurors Accountable
One key reason for requiring judges to be conversant in relevant
technology has less to do with the judges themselves than with those
appearing in their courtrooms, such as lawyers, courtroom staff, and even
jurors. Maintaining courtroom decorum and protecting the integrity of the
justice system is part of the judicial role.66 And while judges necessarily
61. Dan M. Clark, Western NY Judge Resigns Over Administrative, Tech Failures After 28 Years on
Bench, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/12/13/western-nyjudge-resigns-over-administrative-tch-failures-after-28-years-on-bench [https://perma.cc/C69V-W8
JK].
62. Id.
63. News Release, N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, Town Court Justice in Chautauqua
County Resigns After Being Charged with Administrative Deficiencies (Dec. 13, 2018),
http://cjc.ny.gov/Press.Releases/2018.Releases/Scolton.Bruce.S.Release.2018-12-13.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5BRV-TBJD].
64. Id.
65. Clark, supra note 61.
66. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 1, r. 2.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
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depend upon counsel appearing before them to help achieve these goals by
reminding litigants and witnesses to adhere to the court’s instructions, the
fact remains that technology misuse can threaten the integrity of the system.
From jurors tweeting or commenting online about the cases before them—
such as “researching” the parties and issues online67—to lawyers failing to
uphold their duty of candor to the tribunal,68 the sanctity of the trial process
can be undermined by the online misconduct of those participating in the
process. Judges must not only be aware of the potential for such
misbehavior by those in their courtrooms; they should also have at least a
basic grasp of the technology that could enable such undermining of the
court’s authority.
Take, for example, a lawyer’s duty of candor to the tribunal.69 While
there have been several anecdotal examples of lawyers who have obtained a
continuance from a judge only to later face a reckoning when their Facebook
activities betray the false grounds for delays, the simple fact is that using
technological means to verify a lawyer’s story can help a judge.70 For
example, in 2018 a Texas lawyer received a probated suspension for
testifying falsely in a probation review hearing.71 The attorney’s
involvement in the proceeding began innocently enough: he took a friend
out to a bar for drinks, and memorialized their night out celebrating with
photos on Facebook.72 Unfortunately, the friend in question was on
probation and barred from drinking alcohol, frequenting establishments
serving alcohol, or violating a curfew.73 The lawyer testified at the
probation hearing that the friend was not with him, only to have his lack of

67. See Michael R. Sisak, Weinstein Lawyers: ‘Circus’ Atmosphere, Juror Tweets Unfair, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, (Jan. 15, 2020, 7:52 AM), https://apnews.com/3828f1b0f398724cd7cee3b543185366 [https://
perma.cc/TC53-V8N8] (“As if picking a jury for Harvey Weinstein’s rape trial wasn’t complicated
enough, some potential jurors have been posting on social media about their involvement in the case,
violating court rules that could land them behind bars . . . .”).
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
69. Id. r. 3.03.
70. See Charles Toutant, Late-Filing Lawyer’s Excuse Undone by Vacation Photos on Instagram,
N.J. L.J. (Apr. 27, 2018, 5:44 PM), https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/2018/04/27/late-filinglawyers-excuse-undone-by-vacation-photos-on-instagram/?slreturn=20200023015227
[https://
perma.cc/UYB3-5K6B] (sanctioning attorney who falsified justification for requesting extension after
missing a filing deadline).
71. Comm’n for Law. Discipline v. Giovannini, File No. 201705757 (State Bar of Tex. Evid.
Panel 11-1 June 12, 2018) (on file with author).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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candor revealed when the probation officer brought the Facebook posts (as
well as surveillance video from the bar) to the court’s attention.74
An even more egregious example is New York lawyer, Lina Franco.
Franco, a labor and employment solo practitioner, was representing a group
of restaurant workers in a wage-and-hour violation case, Ha v. Baumgart
Café.75 Having missed a filing deadline pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, Franco filed a request for an extension of time sixteen days
after the fact.76 As good cause for the extension, Franco represented to the
court that she had missed her deadline due to a family emergency in
Mexico City, attaching what appeared to be a travel website itinerary
showing her flights to and from New York and Mexico City.77
Unfortunately for Franco, her opposing counsel owned a calendar and
was social media savvy.78 Defense attorney Benjamin Xue responded with
exhibits of screenshots from Franco’s Instagram account during the period
of time she was supposedly in Mexico City caring for her ailing mother,
which showed Franco enjoying a Thanksgiving dinner in New York, visiting
a bar in Miami, attending an art exhibit in Miami, and sitting poolside in
Miami (note: enjoying a poolside margarita does not count as “visiting
Mexico”).79
Caught red-handed, Franco admitted her lack of candor to the court,
stated she was “not honest,” and claimed she had experienced so much
emotional distress from caring for her mother at an earlier juncture that it
caused her to miss the filing deadline and provide the fake itinerary.80
Further falling on her sword, Franco withdrew as counsel for the three
restaurant worker plaintiffs.81 However, lawyers for the restaurant
owners sought sanctions against Franco. United States Magistrate
Judge Michael A. Hammer agreed with the defense, finding that Franco had

74. Id.
75. Toutant, supra note 70.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id. (“Her purported flight itinerary showed her taking a flight to Mexico City on
Thursday, Nov. 21, but defense lawyer Benjamin Xue pointed out that Nov. 21 was a Monday, not a
Thursday.”).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel Pursuant to L. Civ. R. 102.1, Ha v. Baumgart
Café, Case 2:15-cv-05530-ES-MAH, 2018 WL 1981478 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2016), ECF No. 61.

2020]

Should Judges Have a Duty of Tech Competence?

189

“deliberately misled the Court and the other attorneys in this case.”82
Judge Hammer imposed sanctions of $10,000 against Franco.83
Of course, it is not just lawyers’ use of technology that judges need to be
aware of; courtroom staff’s misuse of social media platforms can also
endanger public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the justice
system. Consider, for example, the case of April C. Shepard, a Kansan
court reporter at the Wyandotte County District Court, who had previously
served in the same capacity for the Shawnee County District Court. In
December 2019, the Kansas Supreme Court entered a public reprimand
against Shepard for comments she had made on social media that the court
and the Kansas State Board of Examiners of Court Reporters found had
undermined public confidence in the “independence, integrity, and impartiality of
the judiciary.”84
In 2012, Shepard was the court reporter for a highly publicized murder
trial, State v. Chandler.85 In late October 2017, while the case was on appeal,
the Topeka Capitol Journal published an article that included a number of
comments that Shepard made on Facebook concerning the trial:
•

“Oh, stop. Dana Chandler is not innocent. She may get a new trial
but the outcome will be the same.”

•

“No one else would’ve done this but Dana Chandler.”

•

“I’m confident they got the right perpetrator in this case. Look,
I was there, I reported that whole case. I saw firsthand this case.
I do agree, though, a lot of times they have prosecuted the wrong
person and I believe those people should be exonerated however it
happens. This case however is very different.”86

Chandler’s appeal was successful, and in April 2018, her conviction was
overturned.87 Although Shepard acknowledged making the Facebook
posts, she insisted that “she handled herself in an impartial and objective
82. Toutant, supra note 70.
83. A total of $44,283 in attorney’s fees were sought by the three defense firms, but
Judge Hammer rejected the requests as “unreasonably high.” Id.
84. In re Shepard, 453 P.3d 288, 294 (Kan. 2019) (quoting KAN. S. CT. R. 441).
85. State v. Chandler, 414 P.3d 713 (Kan. 2018). The defendant, Dana Chandler, had been
convicted of killing her ex-husband and his girlfriend. Id. at 717–18.
86. In re Shepard, 453 P.3d at 290.
87. See Chandler, 414 P.3d at 716 (reversing Chandler’s murder convictions and remanding “this
case to the district court for further proceedings”).
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manner” during the trial.88 However, despite her claim that the online
comments in question were made more than four years after the trial, she
admitted that “in hindsight, perhaps that was not the appropriate thing to
do.”89
The Kansas Supreme Court ordered that Shepard receive a public
reprimand, noting her status as an officer of the court and stating that
“courts and officers of the court must maintain an image of fairness and
impartiality in the administration of justice.”90 Going further, the court
observed that
Respondent knew the case she was discussing was on appeal because her
Facebook comment acknowledged the possibility that the defendant may get
a new trial but opined the defendant would be found guilty again. This
comment, along with her other comments that spanned almost a year and a
half, completely ignores the presumption of innocence that defendant carries
throughout a trial. Respondent’s comments are concrete and classic examples
of bias or prejudice against a party.91

A judge who is tech competent will not only be aware of the potential for
lawyers and staff to engage in online misconduct but will also be vigilant in
detecting the disruptive effects of jurors who threaten the integrity of the
justice system through various forms of online misconduct. Such
misconduct consists of jurors “researching” the parties and issues online
and communicating with third parties—or even litigants themselves—via
social media platforms.92 This is a persistent issue that has been the subject
of considerable attention, including scholarly articles.93 It has also led to
many jurisdictions revising or updating their jury instructions and
admonishments to address this threat from inside the jury box.94
It is sufficient to note that it is important in this Digital Age for a judge
to be aware of how damaging jurors’ online activities can be to the integrity
88. In re Shepard, 453 P.3d at 290.
89. Id. at 291.
90. Id. at 293.
91. Id. at 294.
92. See Sisak, supra note 67 (discussing a judge’s warnings to jurors involving the use of social
media and its potentially prejudicial affects).
93. See, e.g., Browning, supra note 9, at 183 (addressing issues involving tech competence and
ethics within the judiciary and legal profession).
94. See Amy J. St. Eve et al., More From the #Jury Box: The Latest on Juries and Social Media, 12 DUKE
L. & TECH. REV. 64, 86–89 (2014) (“[T]he best way to ensure an impartial jury in the age of social
media is through carefully crafted jury instructions.”).
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of judicial proceedings and the presumption of those proceedings’ fairness
and impartiality. To illustrate how this continues to be a concern, one need
look no further than the most recent high-profile trial in the media’s glare:
the sexual assault trial in New York of former movie mogul
As jury selection got underway, presiding
Harvey Weinstein.95
Judge James Burke commented about the tendency of prospective jurors to
venture onto social media despite the court’s warnings: “The court was
alerted recently that a few prospective jurors from last week went on
Facebook and Twitter as if I hadn’t just said not to, what was it, a hundred
times? A thousand times? Was anything I said ambiguous?”96
Among the potential jurors who had been dismissed, was a man who had
“tweeted about leveraging ‘serving on the jury of a high-profile case’ to
promote a novel” he had written.97 The would-be juror narrowly avoided
jail time for violating Judge Burke’s orders not to tweet about the trial.98 As
this latest case illustrates, part of a judge’s technological competence
involves being aware of and proactive about the dangers of impermissible
online activities by jurors.
B. Cyberthreats: Courts Under Siege
Yet, another reason for requiring some degree of tech competence on the
part of judges is that the environment in which courts exist is one that is
increasingly under attack from cyberthreats, such as ransomware attacks or
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.99 In December 2015, and
again in June 2016, the Minnesota Judicial Branch suffered coupling
cyberattacks, the second of which disrupted its website functionality for
95. Sisak, supra note 67; see also J. Clara Chan, Prospective Harvey Weinstein Juror Who Tweeted About
Trial Could Face Jail Time, WRAP (Jan. 16, 2020, 1:22 PM), https://www.thewrap.com/harveyweinstein-trial-prospective-jurors-tweet-jail-time/ [https://perma.cc/36LF-6URF] (outlining possible
repercussions faced by a juror whose use of social media violated a judge’s order).
96. Sisak, supra note 67.
97. Id.
98. Elizabeth Wagmeister, Weinstein Judge Lectures Would-be Juror Over Bad Tweet, VARIETY
(Mar. 10, 2020, 8:42 AM), https://variety.com/2020/biz/news/harvey-weinstein-juror-howardmittelmark-tweet-court-judge-1203528690/ [https://perma.cc/L87F-PWM3].
99. See Herbert B. Dixon Jr., Cyberattacks on Courts and Other Government Institutions, JUDGES’ J.,
Summer 2018, at 37, 38 (“[T]he purpose of [a DDoS attack] is to deny access to the website by
legitimate users.”); Victoria Hudgins, When Local Courts Get Hit by Cyberattacks, Who’s Liable?,
LEGALTECH NEWS (June 3, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/2019/06/03/w
hen-local-courts-get-hit-by-cyberattacks-whos-liable/?slreturn=20200115145226 [https://perma.cc/
GA8D-SYE6] (“The growing number of local governments targeted by cyberattacks highlights that
data breaches are not just the problem of private entities but a threat to the public sector, too.”).
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ten days.100 This “DDoS attack overwhelmed the Minnesota Judicial
Branch’s website with network traffic that blocked out typical users.”101 In
January 2014, cyberterrorists launched cyberattacks on the federal court
system that led to a brief outage of some court websites as well as the
PACER system.102 For hours, these attacks disrupted bankruptcy courts,
district courts, and circuit appellate courts nationwide. As one observer
described the risks if such attacks had been successful: “Personal data of
court patrons is at risk—compromising their identities and inviting fraud.
Intrusion into the court systems could sabotage the workings of the
judiciary—even introduce subversive information that could throw the
outcome of a case.”103
Cyberattacks have unfortunately become a part of the new reality that
courts have to cope with in the Digital Age. In March 2018, the municipal
courts of the City of Atlanta were hit with a ransomware attack that
rendered its systems unable to process ticket payments or validate
outstanding warrants.104 In May 2019, “the First Judicial District of
Pennsylvania shut down Philadelphia’s court website, including its docket
tracking and litigation filing features,” due to a “virus intrusion” found on
court computers.105 In late April 2019, Potter County, Texas, was
victimized by a ransomware attack that shut down its entire network of
550 computers and reduced all of its court employees to the use of pencils
and paper.106 That event pales in comparison to the coordinated
ransomware attack in August 2019 that struck at least twenty-three small
Texas cities, paralyzing the computer systems of police, courts, and other
entities.107
Since courts, like most governmental entities, usually possess sensitive
information concerning both individuals and companies, they are a tempting
100. Dixon, supra note 99, at 38.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 39.
103. Donna Rogers, Gone Phishing, CTS. TODAY, Aug.–Sept. 2017, at 34, 40.
104. Dixon, supra note 99, at 37.
105. Hudgins, supra note 99.
106. Tiffany Lester, Three Viruses Attack Potter Co. Computer System, Employees Anxious to Return to
Work, ABC7 NEWS (Apr. 26, 2019), https://abc7amarillo.com/news/local/three-viruses-attackpotter-co-computer-system-employees-anxious-to-return-to-work [https://perma.cc/VC8B-KHNY].
107. Antonio Villas-Boas, 23 Towns in Texas Were Hit by Possibly the Largest-Ever Ransomware
Attack, in What Could Be the First Coordinated Cyberattack of Its Kind, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 20, 2019,
12:34 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/texas-ransomware-attack-affects-23-towns-single-atta
cker-2019-8 [https://perma.cc/6XEA-EM9U].
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target for cyberattacks, regardless of whether the motive is ransom, theft of
data, or simply disruption.108 An increasing number of courts are realizing
the growing necessity to educate court personnel on how to prevent or
mitigate the risks of cyberattacks, just as more courts are formulating
response plans in the event of such attacks.109 Because the greatest areas
of vulnerability for any institution is its human personnel, who can fall prey
to phishing emails and other means for bad actors to gain access, it is vital
that judges appreciate the risk of cyberattacks. It is essential for judges and
other individuals to practice good digital hygiene. And in an environment
in which court systems find themselves in the crosshairs of cyberterrorists,
the stakes are much higher than the fleeting embarrassment of an
inadvertent “reply all” email or other electronic misstep.
C. Technology In, and Before, the Courts
Perhaps the most obvious reason for requiring judges to be tech
competent is the fact that, as society has become more
technologically-obsessed, more of the disputes making their way to the
judicial arena involve technology issues or the presentation of evidence from
less traditional sources.110 And in the era of e-discovery, digital filing,
lawyers presenting their cases using tablets or laptops, and a dizzying array
of trial presentation software, the very nature of how a case is initiated,
worked up, and put before a judge and jury has fundamentally changed. We
live and practice in a world where the evidence may come from a tweet or
Facebook post; the emoji in an email or text may be subject to different
interpretations with varying legal significance; digital evidence from a Fitbit
or Amazon Echo could alter the course of a case; and a judge’s
decision-making on everything from bail consideration to sentencing or
probation guidelines may be impacted by an algorithm.111 At least one
writer (herself a former federal judge) has written about the potential for

108. See Dixon, supra note 99, at 39 (listing motives behind cyberhacking incidents).
109. See id. (“[C]ourts and other government institutions have a responsibility to protect the
information and data they hold.”).
110. See Sheila Jasanoff & Dorothy Nelkin, Science, Technology, and the Limits of Judicial Competence,
68 A.B.A J. 1094, 1094 (1982) (“The resulting surge of science-related disputes into the judicial arena
has produced a set of difficult and highly visible problems for the courts . . . .”).
111. See generally Goldman, supra note 4 (surveying multiple challenges courts face when dealing
with new technologies in courtrooms).
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artificial intelligence holographic judges to shoulder some of a court’s
caseload.112
A related issue concerns not just how evidence comes before a judge in
the twenty-first century, but the substance of the disputes themselves
becoming more technology-oriented.113 Some legal scholars have noted
the need for judges who are more conversant in technology, since
“[r]esolution of scientific and technological controversies occupies an
increasingly important position in the agenda of the federal courts.”114
Technology writers and legal scholars alike have never been shy about
criticizing courts that “get it wrong” about the technological issues that
come before them.
One prime example is the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals sentencing Eric Lundgren to fifteen months in prison and
fining him $500,000 for “counterfeiting” software recovery disks that
Microsoft gives away for free, a result that one writer said betrayed the
judge’s “near total ignorance of technology.”115 Some observers, however,
point to the fact that “judges everywhere rely on lawyers to explain the
nuances of the cases before them,” and that cases involving technology are
no different—therefore, the stereotype of the Luddite judge is just that, a
stereotype.116
IV. CONCLUSION
Justices on the United States Supreme Court have, on multiple occasions,
prompted chuckles during oral argument at their lack of understanding
of everyday technology “such as email, pagers, cloud storage, social media,”
and streaming services like Netflix (or, as Justice Sonia Sotomayor
described it, “Netflick”).117 However, in cases like South Dakota v. Wayfair

112. Katherine B. Forrest, The Holographic Judge, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 30, 2019, 12:15 AM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/12/30/the-holographic-judge/ [https://perma.cc/
KA8Y-34HZ] (suggesting artificial intelligence as a way to alleviate heavy court caseloads).
113. See Jasanoff & Nelkin, supra note 110, at 1094 (“Science itself has become a focus of
litigation . . . .”).
114. Id.
115. Mike Masnick, How Microsoft Convinced Clueless Judges to Send a Man to Jail for Copying Software
It Gives Out for Free, TECHDIRT (Apr. 17, 2018, 6:22 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20180426/00051939718/how-microsoft-convinced-clueless-judges-to-send-man-to-jail-copyingsoftware-it-gives-out-free.shtml [https://perma.cc/K7FV-VY3V].
116. Tad Simons, Are Luddite Judges Really a Problem?, THOMSON REUTERS LEGAL
EXEC. INST. (July 17, 2018), http://www.legalexecutiveinstitute.com/justice-ecosystem-ludditejudges/ [https://perma.cc/PTM2-W4XM].
117. Id.
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Inc.118 or Carpenter v. United States,119 the Court recognized that digital
technologies have irrevocably altered relationships between the government
and the governed, and so adjusted constitutional jurisprudence
accordingly.120 Few observers would demand that judges follow in
the footsteps of United States District Judge William H. Alsup of the
Northern District of California, a longtime coder who taught himself Java
in order to better grasp some of the technology at issue in the landmark
Oracle v. Google litigation.121
However, at the same time, our system cannot afford Luddite judges
either, and requiring some basic degree of tech competence on the part of
judges (akin to what is already required of lawyers in most jurisdictions) is
hardly an outrageous or burdensome proposal. Not only is tech competence
needed to simply remain conversant in overseeing the daily operations of a
court, but issues like e-discovery, data privacy, and the admissibility of digital
evidence also permeate many of the matters that come before the courts.
The world in which judges exercise their responsibilities is no longer
just a physical, but a digital one as well. Judges would be wise to be
mindful of the observations made by New York Supreme Court
Judge Matthew F. Cooper when authorizing service of process via
social media in his 2015 opinion in the Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku122 case:
[A] concept should not be rejected simply because it is novel or nontraditional.
This is especially so where technology and the law intersect. In this age of
technological enlightenment, what is for the moment unorthodox and unusual
stands a good chance of sooner or later being accepted and standard, or even
outdated and passé. And because legislatures have often been slow to react

118. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2096 (2018) (holding that state
governments can tax Internet commerce).
119. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (holding law enforcement’s
collection of cell-site data was a search requiring a warrant under the Fourth Amendment).
120. David P. Fidler, The Supreme Court Adapts Constitutional Law to Address Technological Change,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 11, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/supreme-court-adaptsconstitutional-law-address-technological-change [https://perma.cc/43GF-JTBE].
121. Sarah Jeong, The Judge’s Code, VERGE (Oct. 19, 2017, 10:57 AM), https://www.
theverge.com/2017/10/19/16503076/oracle-vs-google-judge-william-alsup-interview-waymo-uber
[https://perma.cc/4FRV-KAWF].
122. Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709 (N.Y. 2015).
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to these changes, it has fallen on courts to insure that our legal procedures
keep pace with current technology.123

123. Id. at 713–14 (citing New England Merchs. Nat. Bank v. Iran Power Generation &
Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).

